Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion

David Hume·1779

Hume's posthumous dialogue on what reason can tell us about God. Cleanthes argues from the design of the world to a divine mind like our own, Demea defends faith and the a priori proof, and the sceptic Philo picks both apart, ending on the problem of evil.

Contents

1. Pamphilus to Hermippus pp. 5–11

   Pamphilus explains to his friend Hermippus why the subject of natural religion suits the dialogue form: the being of a God is too obvious to dispute, but his nature is so obscure that reasonable men can only differ. He promises an exact account of the conversations he heard between Cleanthes, Philo and Demea.

2. Part I pp. 13–39

   Demea explains why he teaches his children natural theology last. Philo welcomes this, on the grounds that reason is too weak to reach so far, and Cleanthes asks whether a sceptic can really live by his doubts. The three then debate whether religion has gained more from scepticism or from reason.

3. Part II pp. 41–70

   Demea holds that the nature of God is beyond human understanding. Cleanthes replies with the argument from design: the world is a great machine, so its author must resemble the mind of man. Philo attacks the analogy: we have seen houses built, but never worlds, and thought is only one small agitation of the brain.

4. Part III pp. 71–84

   Cleanthes argues that a voice speaking from the clouds, or a library of living books, would point to a mind as plainly as the order of the world does. Demea objects that this makes God too like ourselves, and that the Deity's ways cannot be compared to ours.

5. Part IV pp. 85–100

   Cleanthes says that those who call God's nature incomprehensible are no better than atheists. Philo replies that a divine mind full of ordered ideas needs explaining just as much as an ordered world, so explaining one by the other begins an endless regress.

6. Part V pp. 101–112

   Philo presses the rule that like effects prove like causes. If the world is the work of a mind like ours, nothing proves that its maker is infinite, perfect or single: the world might be the botched first attempt of an infant deity, or the work of a committee of gods.

7. Part VI pp. 113–127

   Philo suggests the world is more like an animal than a machine, with God as its soul. Cleanthes answers that the world is young, as the recent invention of the arts shows; Philo replies that the arts have been lost and found again, and that matter may be eternal.

8. Part VII pp. 129–143

   Philo argues that the world resembles a plant or an animal more than a work of art, so it might have arisen by vegetation or generation rather than design. If the Brahmins say the world was spun by a great spider, he asks, what has Cleanthes to oppose them with but his own preference?

9. Part VIII pp. 145–158

   Philo revives the Epicurean hypothesis: matter in endless motion, given infinite time, might fall into the stable order we now see. Every religious system meets as great difficulties as this one, he concludes, so suspense of judgment is our only reasonable course.

10. Part IX pp. 159–170

    Demea offers the a priori argument: everything that exists must have a cause, and the chain of causes ends in a necessarily existent Being. Cleanthes rejects it: no matter of fact can be demonstrated, and the material world itself might as well be the necessarily existent being.

11. Part X pp. 171–196

    Demea and Philo agree on the misery and wickedness of human life, which poets and philosophers have always lamented. Cleanthes denies that misery outweighs happiness. Philo answers that even so, a mixture of good and evil can never prove an infinitely good and powerful creator.

12. Part XI pp. 197–226

    Cleanthes proposes a finitely perfect Deity, limited by circumstances. Philo lists four circumstances behind the world's evils, none of which seems necessary, and concludes that the first cause is indifferent to good and evil. Demea, seeing where the argument is going, leaves.

13. Part XII pp. 227–264

    Left alone with Cleanthes, Philo admits that the design of nature strikes every mind, and argues that the quarrel between theist and atheist is largely verbal. He condemns vulgar superstition and its harms to morality and society, and ends by recommending philosophical scepticism as the first step to being a believing Christian. Pamphilus judges that Cleanthes comes nearest the truth.